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the equilibrium path can uniquely implement any desired competitive equilibrium. A large literature
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This approach speci￿es the set of instruments available to policymakers. The Ramsey problem
is to ￿nd the competitive equilibrium that maximizes social welfare with the given set of
instruments. Barro (1979), Lucas and Stokey (1983) among many others have extended
this approach to situations with uncertainty by specifying the instruments as functions of
exogenous events. This extension has made the approach very useful in addressing policy
questions in macroeconomics1.
While the Ramsey approach has been very useful in characterizing the best competitive
outcomes, by itself it is not an operational guide to policy in the sense that it does not
tell policy-makers how to conduct policy for all possible histories. An approach that is
an operational guide would specify policies for every history and would describe what the
corresponding outcomes will be for every history. Here we extend the language of Chari
and Kehoe (1993) to an environment in which the policymaker has commitment in order to
specify policies after every history and to describe continuation outcomes after every history.
In our approach, we allow policies to depend on the history of past actions by private agents
and allow them to di⁄er on and o⁄the equilibrium path. We label such policies sophisticated
policies and label the resulting equilibrium a sophisticated equilibrium.
In many macroeconomic models, especially monetary models, many ways of specifying
policies lead to indeterminacy and therefore could lead to undesirable outcomes. In such
models the question of pressing interest is, Can policies be speci￿ed as operational guides
which tell policymakers what to do after every history and which lead a desired outcome to
be the unique equilibrium outcome? If we can, then we say the policy uniquely implements
the desired outcome.
In this paper we study two standard monetary economies: a simple model with one
period price setting and a model with Calvo price setting. The main contribution in this
paper is to show that, under su¢ cient conditions, any outcome of a competitive equilibrium
can be uniquely implemented by appropriately chosen sophisticated policies.
Our ￿ndings are of particular relevance to monetary policy. The simplest way of
applying the Ramsey approach to policy-making is to ￿nd the desired competitive equilibrium,
which speci￿es policy as a function of exogenous events, and use that function for policy. Thisway of describing policies is problematic in monetary policy environments in which policy-
makers use short-term interest rates as their principal monetary policy instrument. The
reason is that, since at least the early work of Sargent and Wallace (1975), researchers have
been aware that policies which make interest rates functions only of exogenous events can
lead to indeterminate outcomes. Such policies could lead to the best equilibrium but they
could also lead to undesirable outcomes including hyperin￿ ation and outcomes with excessive
volatility due to sunspot-like ￿ uctuations. In this sense, policies which lead to indeterminacy
are risky and researchers generally agree that such policies should be avoided.
This concern with the risks arising from indeterminacy has led to a substantial litera-
ture which is aimed at ￿nding policy rules which eliminate indeterminacy. (See, for example,
McCallum 1979 and for some recent work see Woodford 2003.) The recent literature argues
that interest rate rules should follow the Taylor principle: interest rates should rise more
than one-for-one with a rise in in￿ ation rates relative to target in￿ ation. The reasoning is
that an interest rate rule that obeys the Taylor principle leads to unique outcomes while a
rule that violates it leads to indeterminacy. A related literature argues that the undesirable
in￿ ation experiences of the 1970s in the United States was due in large part to the failure of
monetary policy to obey the Taylor principle in that time period. (See, for example, Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (2000).)
Our ￿nding that sophisticated policies can implement any equilibrium outcome implies
that such policies can implement outcomes which violate the Taylor Principle along the
equilibriumpath as well as those which obey such a principle along the equilibriumpath. Since
sophisticated policies can uniquely implement any desired competitive equilibrium it follows
that adherence to the Taylor principle is not needed for uniqueness. Moreover, our ￿ndings
imply that historical evidence that policy violated the Taylor principle in some periods does
not necessarily imply that such policy was unwise.
Our paper is also related to previous papers that address problems of indeterminacy in
monetary economies (see Wallace 1981, Obstfeld and Rogo⁄1983, Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe,
Uribe 2001, Christiano and Rostagno 2001, King, 2001, and Svensson and Woodford, 2005).
Read at face value these papers pursue a di⁄erent approach to implementation that we refer
to as implementation via nonexistence. The idea is to specify policies so that for all outcomes
2but the desired one, no competitive equilibrium exists. This approach is quite di⁄erent from
the approach taken here as well as the approach taken in the microeconomic literature on
implementation. The general idea of implementation via nonexistence pursued in various
contexts has been criticized in both the macroeconomic and the microeconomic literature.
In the macroeconomic literature Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999), Buiter (2002), Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2004), and Bassetto (2005) criticize this general idea in the context of the ￿scal
theory of the price level and Cochrane (2007) criticizes in the context text of the literature
on monetary policy rules. In the microeconomic literature, Jackson (2001) criticizes a similar
approach to implementation.
We agree with those who argue that this approach trivializes the implementation
problem. To see why, consider the following policy. If private agents choose the desired
outcome, continue with the desired policy. If private agents deviate from the desired outcome:
then forever after set government spending at a high level and taxes to zero. Clearly, any
deviation leads to nonexistence of equilibrium and hence we trivially have implementation
via nonexistence. Our approach, in contrast, insists that policies be speci￿ed so that a
competitive equilibrium exists following any deviation. We achieve implementation in the
traditional microeconomic sense, namely by specifying policies which provide incentives for
agents not to deviate￿ not by nonexistence. In our approach policies are speci￿ed so that even
if all other agents deviate an individual agent has no incentive to do so.
Despite our criticisms of implementation via nonexistence, the papers in this literature
make two valuable contributions. The ￿rst is the idea of regime-switching. This idea dates
back to at least Wallace (1981) and has been used by Obstfeld and Rogo⁄(1983), Christiano
and Rostagno (2001), and Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, Uribe (2002). The basic idea in, say,
Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, Uribe (2002) is that if the economy embarks on an undesirable
path some combination of monetary and ￿scal policy switches regimes in such a way that the
government￿ s budget constraint is violated and no equilibrium exists.
We use regime-switching in some of our sophisticated policies. We show that under
su¢ cient conditions switching from an interest regime to a money regime after deviations can
uniquely implement any desired outcome. In contrast to the existing literature, however, we
do not achieve implementation via nonexistence, but rather by structuring the money regime
3so as to discourage deviations in the ￿rst place.
The second idea is that of the King rule, namely an interest rate policy which makes
the di⁄erence between the interest rate and its target is a linear function of the di⁄erence
between in￿ ation and its target, with a coe¢ cient greater than 1: This idea dates back to
at least King (2001) and has been used by Svensson and Woodford (2004). Restricting
attention to equilibria in which all variables are bounded, this rule implements equilibria
via nonexistence: any deviation of outcomes from the target cause the outcomes to become
unbounded thus lead to nonexistence of (bounded) equilibria.
As we show, in the simple model the King rule cannot uniquely implement any out-
comes and in the Calvo model it cannot implement some unbounded outcomes. Interestingly,
this rule, appropriately translated, leads to unique implementation of bounded equilibria in
the Calvo model. But, again, our implementation works by discouraging deviations not via
nonexistence.
The basic idea of the construction is the same in both models. Consider constucting
central bank policies that uniquely implement a desired competitive equilibrium. Along the
equilibrium path choose the policies to be those given by the desired competitive equilibrium.
Structure the policies o⁄the equilibrium path, referred to as reversion policies, to discourage
deviations. Speci￿cally, if the average choice of private agents deviates from those in the
desired equilibrium, choose the reversion policies so that the optimal choice, or best response,
of each individual agent is di⁄erent from the average choice.
Our construction requires that best responses be controllable, in the sense that policies
can be found which ensure that, following any deviation, the best response of any individual
private agent is di⁄erent from the average choice of the private agents. Controllability imples
that reversion policies can be constructed so that no deviation is optimal and hence that
the desired equilibrium is uniquely implemented. A su¢ cient condition for controllability is
that policies can be found so that the continuation equilibrium is unique and varies with
policy. The latter requirement typically holds so that if policies can be found under which
the continuation equilibrium is unique (somewhere) then we have unique implementation
(everywhere). This su¢ cient condition suggests a simple way to state the general message of
our paper: uniqueness somewhere generates uniqueness everywhere.
4Our reversion policies have an important property: they are not extreme in any sense.
Indeed, they simply bring in￿ ation back to the desired path and do not threaten the private
economy with dire outcomes following deviations.
One concern with our construction is that it apparently relies on the idea that the
central bank perfectly observe private agents￿actions and thus can detect any deviation. We
show that our results are robust to imperfect information about private agents￿actions.
Here we propose one way to eliminate indeterminacy under interest rate rules. For
some other proposed resolutions to the indeterminacy issue, see the work of Bassetto (2002)
and Adao, Correia, and Teles (2006).
1. A Simple Model with One-Period Price Stickiness
We begin by illustrating the basic idea of our construction of sophisticated policies
using the simple model with one-period price setting because the dynamical system associated
with the competitive equilibrium is very simple and this simplicity allows us to focus on the
strategic aspects of sophisticated policies. In a subsequent section we investigate a New
Keynesian model with multiperiod price setting.
The model we use to analyze the optimal choice of a monetary policy instrument is
a modi￿ed version of the basic sticky price model with a New Classical Phillips curve (as
in Woodford 2003, Chap. 3, Sec. 1.3). Here, in order to make our results comparable to
those in the literature, we describe a simple, linearized version of the model. In Appendix A,
we describe the general equilibrium model that when linearized gives rise to the equilibrium
conditions studied here. Our implementation result holds in the nonlinear model as well.
A. The Determinants of Output and In￿ ation
Consider a monetary economy populated by a large number of identical, in￿nitely
lived consumers, a continuum of producers, and a central bank. Each producer uses labor
to produce a di⁄erentiated good on the unit interval: Producers i 2 [0;￿] are ￿exible price
producers, and producers i 2 [￿;1] are sticky price producers.
The timing within a period is as follows. At the beginning of the period, sticky price
producers set their prices after which the government chooses its monetary policy, either by
setting interest rates or by choosing the quantity of money. Shocks ￿t and ￿t are then realized.
5At the end of the period, ￿ exible price producers set their prices, and consumers make their
decisions. We interpret the shock ￿t as a ￿ight to quality shock that a⁄ects the attractiveness
of government debt relative to private claims and the shock ￿t as a velocity shock.
Here we develop necessary conditions for an equilibrium and then, in the next section,
formally de￿ne an equilibrium. Here and throughout we express all variables in log-deviation
form. In particular, this way of expressing variables implies that none of our equations will
have constant terms.
Consumer behavior in this model is summarized by an intertemporal Euler equation
and a cash-in-advance constraint. We can write the linearized Euler equation as
yt = Et [yt+1] ￿   (it ￿ Et [￿t+1]) + ￿t; (1)
where yt is aggregate output, it is the nominal interest rate, ￿t is an i.i.d. mean zero shock
with variance var(￿), and ￿t+1 = pt+1 ￿ pt is the in￿ ation rate from time period t to t + 1,
where pt is the aggregate price level. The parameter   determines the intertemporal elasticity,
and Et denotes the expectations of a representative agent given that agent￿ s information in
period t, which includes the shock ￿t:
The cash-in-advance constraint, when ￿rst-di⁄erenced, implies that the relationship
between in￿ ation ￿t; money growth ￿t; and output growth yt ￿ yt￿1 is given by a quantity
equation of the form
￿t = ￿t ￿ (yt ￿ yt￿1) + ￿t: (2)
where ￿t is an i.i.d. mean zero shock with variance var(￿):
We turn now to producer behavior. The aggregate price level pt is a linear combination
of the prices pft set by the ￿ exible price producers and the prices pst set by the sticky price








The optimal price set by an individual ￿ exible price producer i satis￿es
pft(i) = pt + ￿yt; (4)
6where the parameter ￿ is the elasticity of the equilibrium real wage with respect to output and
is referred to in the literature as Taylor￿ s ￿: The optimal price set by sticky price producer i
satis￿es
pst(i) = Et￿1 [pt + ￿yt]; (5)
where Et￿1 denotes expectations at the beginning of period t before the shock ￿t is realized.
Using language from game theory, we can think of equations (4) and (5) as akin to the best
responses of each ￿ exible and sticky price producer given their beliefs about the aggregate
price level and aggregate output. Equations (1)￿ (5) completely describe the simple model.
In this model, the ￿ exible price producers are uninteresting strategically, in that their
expectations about the future have no in￿ uence on their decisions. Their prices are set me-
chanically according to the static considerations re￿ ected in (4). In all that follows, equation
(4) will hold on and o⁄ the equilibrium path, and we can think of pft(i) as being residually
determined by (4) and substitute out for pft(i) from these equations. To do so, substitute
(4) into (3) and solve for pt to get






where ￿ = ￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿): Now the system is summarized by (1), (2), (5), and (6).
We follow the literature and express the sticky price producers￿decisions in in￿ ation
rates rather than price levels. To do so, let xt(i) = pst(i) ￿ pt￿1 and rewrite (5) as
xt(i) = Et￿1 [￿t + ￿yt]: (7)







to be the average price set by the sticky price producers relative to the aggregate price level
in period t ￿ 1: We can then rewrite (6) as
￿t = ￿yt + xt: (9)
For later use, note that the economy is summarized by (1), (2), and (7)￿ (9), so that when
checking whether a constructed outcome is a competitive equilibrium, we will need only to
check whether these equations are satis￿ed.
7In the following lemma, we show how this economy produces the key features of a New
Classical Phillips curve along the equilibrium path in which
xt(i) = xt: (10)
(See the discussion below for what happens following deviations from the equilibrium path.)
Lemma 1. Any allocations that satisfy (7)￿(9) and (10) satisfy (i)
xt = Et￿1￿t; (11)
(ii) Et￿1yt = 0; and (iii) the New Classical Phillips curve:
￿t = ￿yt + Et￿1￿t (12)
where ￿ = ￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿):
Proof. To prove (ii), substitute (9) into (7): Integrating both sides of the resulting
equation from ￿ to 1 and using (8) yields (ii). Taking expectations of both sides of (9) and
using (ii) yields (i) and (iii). Q:E:D:
Note that when it sets monetary policy, the central bank chooses to operate under
either a money regime or an interest rate regime. In the money regime, the central bank
sets ￿t, and the interest rate is residually determined from (1) after the realization of the
shock ￿t: In the interest rate regime, the central bank sets it, and money growth is residually
determined from (2) after the realization of the shock ￿t: Of course, in both regimes, equations
(1) and (2) hold.
B. Competitive Equilibrium
We de￿ne a notion of competitive equilibrium in the spirit of Barro (1979) and Lucas
and Stokey (1983). In this equilibrium allocations, prices, and policies are all de￿ned as
functions of the history of exogenous events st = (s0;:::;st), where st = (￿t;￿t):
The actions of the sticky price producers, in￿ ation, and output can be summarized
by fxt(st￿1);￿t(st);yt(st)g: In terms of the policies we ￿nd it convenient to let the regime
choice as well as the policy choice within the regime as ￿t(st￿1) = (￿1t(st￿1);￿2t(st￿1)) where
8the ￿rst argument ￿1t(st￿1) 2 fM;Ig denotes the regime choice, money (M) or interest rates
(I), and the second argument denotes the policy choice within the regime, either money
growth ￿t(st￿1) or interest rates it(st￿1): If the money regime is chosen at t the interest rate
is determined residually at the end of the period while if the interest rate regime is chosen
at t then the money growth rate is determined residually at the end of the period. Let at(st)
denote the allocations, prices, and policies in this competitive equilibrium.
A collection of allocations, prices, and policies at(st) = fxt(st￿1);￿t(st);yt(st);￿t(st￿1)g
is a competitive equilibrium if it satis￿es (1), (2), (9), and (11).
C. Sophisticated Equilibrium
We now turn to sophisticated equilibrium. This de￿nition is very similar to that of
the de￿nition of competitive equilibrium except that we allow allocations, prices, and policies
to be functions of the history of both aggregate private actions and policies as well as the
history of exogenous events.
We make two observations before we turn to our formal de￿nition. First our de￿nition
of sophisticated equilibrium simply speci￿es policy rules by the central bank and does not
require any form of optimality by the central bank. We specify sophisticated policies in this
manner to show that our result regarding unique implementation does not depend on the
objectives of the central bank. One way of thinking of our sophisticated policies is that the
policies are speci￿ed at the beginning of period 0 and then the central bank is is committed
to follow them.
Second, the only interesting private agents in this model are the sticky price producers.
Their behavior at the beginning of period t depends on what they expect the government to
do and what other sticky price producers do. The ￿ exible price producers are described by
a simple static rule (4). The behavior of the consumers and the ￿ exible price producers is
summarized by an intertemporal Euler equation (1) and the cash-in-advance constraint (2).
We turn now to de￿ning the histories that private and the central bank confront when
they make their decisions. The public events that occur in a period are, in chronological
order, qt = (xt;￿t;st;yt;￿t). Letting ht denote the history of these events from period 0 up
to and including those in period t, we have that ht = (ht￿1;qt) for t ￿ 1 and h0 = q0: As a
9matter of notational convenience, we focus on perfect public equilibria in which the central
bank￿ s strategy is a function of only the public history.
The public history faced by the sticky price producers at the beginning of period t
when they set their prices is ht￿1: A strategy for the sticky price producers is a sequence of
rules ￿s(i) = fxt(i;ht￿1)g for choosing wages for every possible public history, while average
prices by these producers are given by ￿x = fxt(ht￿1)g:
The public history faced by the central bank when it sets its regime and either its
money growth or interest rate policy is hgt = (ht￿1;xt): A strategy for the central bank
f￿t(hgt)g is a sequence of rules for choosing the regime as well as the policy within the
regime, either ￿t(hgt) or it(hgt).
If the money regime is chosen in period t (￿1t(hgt) speci￿es M); then interest rates
it(hyt), output yt(hyt);and in￿ ation rates ￿t(hyt) are determined residually from (1), (2), (9),
and (11) after the relevant shocks are realized, where here hyt = (ht￿1;xt;M;￿t;st) is the
history that determines output, in￿ ation, and interest rates in the current period.
If, instead, in period t the interest rate regime is chosen (￿1t(hgt) speci￿es I); then
the money growth rate ￿t(hyt) as well as output yt(hyt) and in￿ ation ￿t(hyt) are determined
residually from (1), (2), (9), and (11) after the relevant shocks are realized, where here
hyt = (ht￿1;xt;I;it;st) is the history that determines output, in￿ ation, and money growth in
the current period.
We let ￿g denote the strategy of the central bank consisting of the regime choice and
the policies under that regime. At the end of period t, output and in￿ ation are determined
as functions of the relevant history hyt according to the rules yt(hyt) and ￿t(hyt): We let
￿y ={yt(hyt)} and ￿￿ ={￿t(hyt)} denote the sequence of output and in￿ ation rules.
A sophisticated equilibrium given the policies here is a collection of strategies (￿s(i);￿x;￿g)
and output and in￿ ation rules (￿y;￿￿) such that given the other strategies and rules, ￿s(i)
is optimal for all histories in the sense that
xt(i;ht￿1) = E [￿t(hyt) + ￿yt(hyt)]; (13)







10the Phillips curve is given by
￿t(hyt) = ￿yt(hyt) + xt(ht￿1) (15)
and (1) and (2) are satis￿ed in the manner described above.
In light of condition (14) and the observation that given (￿g;￿x); output, in￿ ation, and
the residually determined policy are mechanically given by (1), (2), and (9), we summarize a
sophisticated equilibrium by (￿g;￿x): Note for later, from Lemma 1 that
xt(ht￿1) = E[￿tjht￿1]: (16)
Associated with each sophisticated equilibrium ￿ = (￿g;￿x) are the particular sto-
chastic processes for outcomes that occur along the equilibrium path, called sophisticated
outcomes. These sophisticated outcomes can be generated from the strategies in the stan-
dard recursive fashion. These outcomes can then be written as a function of the history
of exogenous events st = (s0;:::;st), where st = (￿t;￿t): These (on the equilibrium path)
outcomes include allocations a(￿) = fxt(st￿1;￿);￿t(st;￿);yt(st;￿);￿t(st￿1)g: We call an al-
location a(￿) associated with a sophisticated equilibrium ￿ a sophisticated outcome. The
following lemma is an immediate consequence of the de￿nitions of competitive equilibrium
and sophisticated outcomes.
Lemma 2. (Equivalence between competitive equilibria and sophisticated outcomes.)
A sophisticated outcome is a competitive equilibrium and for any given competitive equi-
librium there exists a sophisticated policy which supports the competitive equilibrium as a
sophisticated outcome.
Equilibrium with Sophisticated Policies
We now show that any competitive equilibrium in which the central bank uses interest
rates as its instrument can be uniquely implemented with sophisticated policies. Later we
show that when the central bank uses money as its instrument, unique implementation is
trivial.
The basic idea behind our construction is that the central bank starts by picking
any competitive equilibrium allocations and sets its interest rate policy on the equilibrium
path consistent with this equilibrium. The central bank then constructs its policy o⁄ the
11equilibrium path so that any deviations from these allocations would never be optimal for
the deviating agent. In so doing, the constructed sophisticated policies support the chosen
allocations as the unique equilibrium allocations.
In our construction, we ￿nd it convenient to consider sophisticated policies with one-
period reversion to money. Under these policies, the central bank discourages deviations by
switching to a money regime for one period, and for the rest of the o⁄-the-equilibrium-path
policies, it uses the continuation of what it would have done on the equilibrium path. In
particular, after a deviation, the central bank switches to a level of the money supply which
generates the same expected in￿ ation as in the original equilibrium. (Of course, we could
have chosen many other values that also would discourage deviations, but we found this value
to be the most intuitive one.2) Having the central bank switch to a money regime, instead
of another interest rate in an interest rate regime after a deviation is convenient because as
we show in the following lemma outcomes are uniquely determined under a money regime.
Lemma 3. (Controllability of Best Responses) For any history hgt; if the central bank
chooses the money regime with money growth ￿t; then output yt and in￿ ation ￿t are uniquely
determined and given by
yt =
￿t + ￿t + yt￿1 ￿ xt
1 + ￿
(17)
￿t = ￿yt + xt: (18)
Proof. The proof is immediate from substituting (2) into (9) and recalling that yt￿1
and xt are in the history hgt. Q:E:D:
Note that this lemma applies to histories hgt which have been generated o⁄ the equi-
librium path as well as on it. In particular, it applies to histories in which the sticky price
producers￿choice of in￿ ation xt represents a deviation from their strategies (and does not
equal their expectations of in￿ ation.)
We use this lemma to construct sophisticated policies that uniquely support any com-




t(st)) together with central bank policies i￿
t(st￿1). Consider the following trigger-
type policy that supports these outcomes as unique equilibria: If sticky price producers choose
12xt at t to coincide with the desired outcomes x￿
t(st￿1), then let central bank policy in period
t be i￿
t(st￿1): If not and these producers deviate to some ~ xt(st￿1) 6= x￿
t(st￿1); then for that
period t; let the central bank switch to a money regime with money growth set so that the
expected in￿ ation for that period equals the expected level of in￿ ation in the original equilib-
rium, namely, x￿
t(st￿1): To determine the required level of money growth, use (17) and (18)
to calculate that the required level of money growth is given by
~ ￿t = ~ xt(s











>From period t+1 on along this deviation path, let the central bank use what it would have
done if there had been no deviation. From period t+1 on along the equilibrium path, let the
central bank continue on with the analog of the policies just described.
We use these policies to establish the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Unique Implementation with Sophisticated Policies Any
competitive equilibrium outcome in which the central bank uses interest rates as its instru-
ment can be implemented as a unique equilibrium with sophisticated policies with one-period
reversion to money.
Proof. Consider the sophisticated policies described above, and suppose that in period
t the sticky price producers deviate to ~ xt(st￿1) 6= x￿
t(st￿1). Then the central bank sets money




~ ￿t + ￿t + yt￿1 ￿ ~ xt(st￿1)
1 + ￿
; (20)












We need to show that given these levels of in￿ ation and output, a sticky price producer
will not ￿nd it optimal to make this deviation. That is, the sticky price producer will set







t￿1) + ￿~ yt
i
; (22)
13where we have used the fact that ~ ￿t is constructed to generate a level of in￿ ation equal to
x￿
















since ￿ > 0; clearly xt(i) 6= ~ xt(st￿1) whenever ~ xt(st￿1) 6= x￿
t(st￿1): That is, an individual
sticky price producer will never ￿nd it optimal to follow the deviation ~ xt(st￿1) whenever
~ xt(st￿1) is indeed a deviation from x￿
t(st￿1): Q:E:D:
The logic of the proof of the proposition makes clear that in order for reversions
to money to uniquely implement equilibrium outcomes, sophisticated policies must have a
key controllability property: following a deviation, the central bank can choose policies so
as to make it not optimal for an individual price-setter to cooperate with the deviation.
A su¢ cient condition for this property is that an individual price-setter￿ s best response is
uniquely determined by (and monotone in) the money growth rate. The construction of
money growth given in (19) shows that in the simple model, after a deviation monetary
policy can be chosen in such a way that the best response of any individual price-setter can
be controlled.
A simple way of describing our unique implementation result is that uniqueness of
best responses under some regime guarantees unique implementation of any desired outcome.
Note that if the variance of the money shock vt is large, all of the outcomes under money are
undesirable. Nevertheless, the money regime is useful as an o⁄-equilibrium commitment that
helps support desirable outcomes along the equilibrium path under interest rate regimes.
Finally, as a technical aside, note from the proof of Proposition 1 that we do not need
uniqueness for all money growth policies. Rather, all we need is that for every deviation
we can ￿nd a monetary policy which induces a best response correspondence that does not
include the deviation.
So far we have focused on implementing competitive outcomes when the central bank
uses interest rates as its instrument. From Lemma 3 is immediately follows that it is trivial
to uniquely implement competitive outcomes in which the central bank uses money as its in-
strument. Clearly, we can use a simple generalization of Proposition 3 to uniquely implement
14competitive equilibrium in which the central bank uses interest rates in some periods and
money in other periods: in periods in which the monetary regime speci￿es interest rates, use
sophisticated policies with reversion to money while in periods in which the monetary regime
speci￿es money, make the money growth independent of the decisions of private agents.
Necessity of Regime Switching for Unique Implementation
We now turn to a common way of modeling policies, referred to as restricted policies.
Such policies are restricted to be the same on and o⁄ the equilibrium path and are typically
assumed to be linear functions of private agents￿actions. Here we show that any interest rate
policies that are linear functions of actions and shocks that the central bank has observed lead
to a continuum of equilibria. Hence, such policies cannot uniquely implement any desired
outcome. In this sense, in order to uniquely implement any desired outcome the central bank
must switch from an interest rate regime to a money regime following deviations.
Consider a class of restricted policies of the form










where ￿ {t can depend upon the history of stochastic events f￿sg
t￿1
s=0: Notice that policies of this
kind are linear feedback rules on variables in the central bank￿ s history. We can then can
establish the following result.
Proposition 2. Indeterminacy of Equilibrium Under Restricted Policies
The linear competitive equilibria with interest rate rules of the linear feedback form (23) have
outcomes of the form
xt+1 = it + c￿t; ￿t = xt + ￿(1 +  c)￿t; and yt = (1 +  c)￿t: (24)
For every feedback rule the economy has a continuum of competitive equilibria indexed by
the parameter c and by x0:
Proof. In order to verify that the outcomes which satisfy (24) are part of an equilib-
rium, we need to check that they satisfy (1), (9), and (16). That they satisfy (16) follows
by taking expectations of both sides of the equation ￿t = xt + ￿(1 +  c)￿t: Substituting for
xt+1 from (24) and it from (23) into (1), we obtain that yt = (1 +  c)￿t, as required by (24).
Inspecting the expressions for ￿t and yt in (24) shows that they satisfy (9). Q:E:D:
15This proposition shows that if the central bank follows an interest rate regime in all
periods for all histories, the economy has a continuum of competitive equilibria. In this sense,
unique implemention requires regime switching.
The class of linear feedback rules in (23) includes a popular speci￿cation of the Taylor
rules of the form as
it = ￿ {t + ￿Et￿1￿t + bEt￿1yt: (25)
When the parameter ￿ > 1, such policies are said to satisfy the Taylor principle, namely,
that the central bank should raise its interest rate more than one-for-one with increases in
in￿ ation. When ￿ < 1, such policies are said to violate that principle.
Of course, the Taylor rule is not a well-de￿ned function of histories until we ￿ll in how
expectations are formed. To do so we begin with a simple lemma. The lemma shows that
under any interest rate rule, the expected in￿ ation rate is uniquely determined by the policy,
but the realized in￿ ation rate may not be.
Lemma 4. In any history ht￿1,
E [ytjht￿1] = 0. (26)
If that history gives rise to an interest rate regime, then
E [￿t+1jht￿1] = it(hgt); (27)
where hgt = (ht￿1;xt(ht￿1)):
Proof. Note that (26) is simply a restatement of part (ii) of Lemma 1. Taking expec-
tations of the Euler equation (1) with respect to ht￿1 gives that
E [ytjht￿1] = E [yt+1jht￿1] ￿  (it(ht￿1) ￿ E [￿t+1jht￿1]): (28)
Using the law of iterated expectations gives that E [yt+1jht￿1] = 0: From (28) we then have
(27), that E [￿t+1jht￿1] = it(hgt): Q.E.D.
>From this lemma we know that E [ytjht￿1] = 0: Since E [￿tjht￿1] = xt, policies of the
Taylor rule form can be written as
it = ￿ {t + ￿xt: (29)
16Thus, policies of the Taylor rule form (29) are linear feedback rules of the form (23) and
thus lead to indeterminacy, regardless of the value of ￿: For every ￿ ￿ 1 the economy has
a continuum of unbounded equilibria indexed by c and x0 ￿ 0 as well as a unique bounded
equilibrium with c = 0 and x0 = 0. For ￿ < 1; all the equilibria are bounded.
To discuss boundedness, it is useful to substitute from (29) into the ￿rst equation in
(24) to obtain a di⁄erence equation in expected in￿ ation
xt+1 = ￿ {t + ￿xt + c￿t: (30)
If ￿ ￿ 1, then clearly xt = 0 when c = 0 and x0 = 0 and is unbounded otherwise. If ￿ < 1,
then clearly xt is bounded.
We now show that rules of the form speci￿ed in (23) include rules of the form discussed
by King (2001) and Svensson and Woodford (2005) given by
it = i
￿





t can depend upon the history of stochastic events. The idea behind a King
rule of the form (31) is i￿
t and ￿￿
t are the interest rates and in￿ ation rates that the central
bank desires to implement uniquely. From Lemma 4 the King rule can be written in the form
it = i
￿
t + ￿(xt ￿ x
￿
t): (32)
Clearly, such a rule is of the linear feedback rule form (23).
In the literature, researchers often restrict attention to equilibria in which in￿ ation is
bounded. Here we argue that equilibria in which in￿ ation is unbounded cannot be dismissed in
this model on logical grounds. Equilibria in which in￿ ation explodes are perfectly reasonable
because the explosion in in￿ ation is associated with an explosion in the money supply. To
see this association, suppose that policy is described by a Taylor rule of the form (29) with
￿ { = 0 and ￿ > 1 and, for simplicity, suppose that ￿t = ￿t = 0 for all t: Using (26), we know
that yt = 0 for all t, and hence, from (2) the growth of the money supply is given by
￿t = xt = ￿
tx0: (33)
Thus, in these equilibria, in￿ ation explodes because money growth explodes. Each equilib-
rium is indexed by a di⁄erent initial value of the endogenous variable x0: This endogenous
17variable depends solely on expectations of future policy and is not pinned down by any initial
condition or transversality condition.
The idea that the central bank￿ s printing of money at an ever-increasing rate leads
to a hyperin￿ ation is at the core of most monetary models. In these equilibria, in￿ ation
does not arise from the speculative reasons analyzed by Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (1983) but
from the conventional money printing reasons analyzed by Cagan (1956). In this sense, the
theory predicts for perfectly standard and sensible reasons that if the central bank follows a
Taylor rule that satis￿es the Taylor principle, then the economy can su⁄er from any one of a
continuum of very undesirable paths for in￿ ation.
Now consider an economy with the stochastic shocks: When ￿ ￿ 1; the economy has
two kinds of indeterminate equilibrium. In one kind, c = 0 and expected in￿ ation grows in a
deterministic fashion. In the other kind, c 6= 0 and expected in￿ ation grows in a stochastic
fashion with mean growth rate ￿. When ￿ < 1; the economy has a continuum of bounded
equilibria. In one kind, c = 0 and expected in￿ ation gradually reverts to 0: In the other
kind, c 6= 0 and expected in￿ ation ￿ uctuates and its mean value reverts to 0: The intuitive
idea behind the multiplicity of stochastic equilibria in Proposition 2 associated with c 6= 0 is
that interest rates pin down only expected in￿ ation and not the state-by-state realizations
indexed by the parameter c.
In Proposition 2, we focused on linear competitive equilibria which can be described as
time-invariant linear functions of the shocks: Clearly, there are other competitive equilibria
in which the coe¢ cients of the allocation rules depend on time t as well as the history
of the shocks. There are also competitive equilibria in which the allocations depend on
exogenous sunspots. Our theorems about supporting competitive equilibrium outcomes with
sophisticated policy rules apply equally well to all of these equilibria.
Extension to Interest Elastic Money Demand
To keep the exposition simple we have assumed that money demand is interest inelastic.
This feature of the model implies that if a money regime is adopted in some period t then
the equilibrium outcomes in that period are uniquely determined by the money growth rate
in that period. This uniqueness under a money regime is what allows us to use one-period
18reversion to a money regime to support any desired competitive equilibrium.
Now consider economies with interest elastic money demand. For such economies
consider sophisticated policies which specify an interest regime along the equilibrium path
and an in￿nite reversion to a money regime following a deviation. Such policies can uniquely
implement any desired outcome if best responses are controllable. A su¢ cient condition for
such controllability is that competitive equilibria are unique with a suitably chosen money
regime. As with inelastic money demand the uniqueness under a money regime is what allows
us to use reversions to a money regime to support any desired competitive equilibrium.
A sizable literature has analysed the uniqueness of competitive equilibrium under
money growth policies. Obsteld and Rogo⁄ (1983) and Woodford (1996) provide su¢ cient
conditions for uniqueness of competitive equilibria in such a circumstance. For example,
Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ consider a money-in-the-utility function model with preferences of the
form u(c)+v(m) where m is real balances and show that a su¢ cient condition for uniqueness




These authors focused attention on ￿ exible price models but their results can be readily
extended to our simple sticky price model. Indeed, their su¢ cient conditions apply unchanged
to a deterministic version of our simple sticky price model. The reason is that our model
without shocks is e⁄ectively identical to a ￿ exible price model. Hence, under appropriate
su¢ cient conditions our implementation results extend to environments with interest elastic
money demand.
2. A Model with Staggered Price-Setting
We turn now to a version of the simple model laid out above with staggered price-
setting. The main point of this section is to show that our primary result, namely, that
sophisticated policies can implement uniquely any equilibrium allocation, carries through
to this widely used setting. To make this point in the simplest fashion, we abstract from
aggregate uncertainty. We ￿rst show that, along the lines of the argument for our simple
sticky price model, we can uniquely implement any desired outcome with an in￿nite reversion
to a money regime following a deviation. We then show that, under su¢ cient conditions, we
19can also unique implement any desired outcome with policies that use interest rate regimes
both on and o⁄ the equilibrium path.
We then turn to the implications of our analysis for the Taylor principle. The common
interpretation, stressed by Taylor (1993) and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) among others
is that it refers to the comovements of interest rates and in￿ ation rates along the equilibrium
path. Under this interpretation the stochastic processes for interest rates and in￿ ation rates
satisfy this principle if, on average, along the equilibrium path a rise in in￿ ation rates is
associated with a more than one for one rise in interest rates. We show that the Taylor
principle, interpreted in this fashion, is neither necessary nor su¢ cient for either determinacy
or e¢ ciency.
A more subtle interpretation, stressed by King (2001), Svensson and Woodford (2005),
and Cochrane (2007), is that the Taylor principle is a prescription for what the central bank
will do following a deviation from the equilibrium path. Under this interpretation the Taylor
principle describes the commitments of the central bank to its behavior o⁄ the equilibrium
path. In particular, if in￿ ation rates rise relative to their level on the equilibrium path the
central bank commits to raising interest rates more than one for one with the rise in in￿ ation.
The Taylor principle, interpreted in this fashion, as a statement about o⁄ the equilibrium
path behavior has no relation to the e¢ ciency of the equilibrium. We do show, however,
under su¢ cient conditions a policy rule that obeys the Taylor principle o⁄ the equilibrium
path can ensure determinacy, at least of bounded equilibria.
A. Setup
We begin by setting up the model. We show that sophisticated policies with reversion
to money can implement any competitive equilibrium uniquely and then show that sophis-
ticated policies with reversion to interest rates can implement any competitive equilibrium
uniquely.
Consider, then, a model with no aggregate uncertainty in which prices are set in a
staggered fashion as in Calvo (1983). At the beginning of each period, a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of
producers are randomly chosen and allowed to reset their prices. After that, the central bank
makes its decisions, and then, ￿nally, consumers make their decisions. This economy has no
20￿ exible price ￿rms. The nonlinear economy is described in Appendix A.
The linearized equations for this model are similar to those in the simple model. The
Euler equation (1) and the money growth equation (2) are the same except that there are no
shocks, ￿t;￿t. The price set by a producer which is permitted to reset its price is given by
the analog of (5), which is







Here also Taylor￿ s ￿; is the elasticity of the equilibrium real wage with respect to output:
Letting pst denote the average price set by ￿rms that are permitted to reset their prices in
period t; this equation can be rewritten recursively as
pst(i) = (1 ￿ ￿￿)[￿yt + pt] + ￿￿pst+1; (35)
together with a type of transversality condition limT!1(￿￿)TpsT(i) = 0: The aggregate price
equation can be written as
pt = ￿pt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)pst: (36)
To make our analysis parallel to the literature, we express the decisions of the sticky
price producers in terms of the in￿ ation rate rather than prices. Letting xt(i) = pst(i)￿pt￿1;
with some manipulation, we can rewrite (35) as
xt(i) = (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿yt + ￿t + ￿￿xt+1: (37)
We can also rewrite (36) as
￿t = (1 ￿ ￿)xt; (38)
where xt is the average across i of xt(i):
The transversality-type condition can be rewritten in terms of in￿ ation rates as
lim
T!1(￿￿)
Txt(i) = 0: (39)
In equilibrium, since xt(i) = xt and (38) holds, this restriction is equivalent to
lim
T!1(￿￿)
T￿t = 0: (40)
21In the following lemma, we show that this economy produces the key features of a
New Keynesian Phillips curve along the equilibrium path in which
xt(i) = xt: (41)
Lemma 5. Any allocations that satisfy (37)￿ (41) also satisfy the New Keynesian
Phillips curve
￿t = ￿yt + ￿￿t+1; (42)
where ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)￿=￿:
Proof. To prove (42), substitute for xt using (38) and (41) into (37). Collecting terms
yields (42). Q:E:D:
We then have that a competitive equilibrium must satisfy (1), (2), (40) and (42). In
addition to these conditions, we now argue that a competitive equilibrium must satisfy two
boundedness conditions. Such conditions are controversial in the literature. Standard analy-
ses of New Keynesian models impose strict boundedness conditions, namely that both output
and in￿ ation must be bounded above and below in any reasonable equilibrium. Cochrane
(2007) has forcefully criticized this practice, arguing that any boundedness conditions must
have a solid economic rationale. Here we provide a rationale for two such conditions. In our
view, there are solid arguments for requiring that output yt is bounded above so that
yt ￿ ￿ y for some ￿ y (43)
and in￿ ation is bounded below so that
￿ ￿ ￿ for some ￿: (44)
The rationale for output being bounded above is that in this economy there is a ￿nite
amount of labor to produce the output. The rationale for requiring that in￿ ation is bounded
below comes from the restriction that nominal interest must be nonnegative. (Note that even
though the real value of consumer￿ s holdings of bonds must satisfy a tranversality condition,
this condition does not impose any restrictions on the paths of yt and ￿t: The reason is that
22in our nonlinear model the government has access to lump sum taxes so that government
debt can be arbitrarily chosen to satisfy any transversality condition.)
We think of the boundedness conditions (43) and (44) as being minimal. These bounds
allow for outcomes in which yt; the log of output, falls without bound (so that the level of
output converges to zero). They also allow for outcomes in which in￿ ation rates rise without
bound. For completeness, we provide conditions under which our implementation result holds
with stricter and weaker boundedness conditions below.
With these restrictions, a competitive equilibrium is a sequence of in￿ ation rates and
output which satisfy the deterministic versions of (1), (2), as well as (40), (42), (43) and
(44). Clearly, this de￿nition is analogous to that for a deterministic version of the compet-
itive equilibrium in the simple model. The de￿nition of a sophisticated equilibrium is also
analogous to that in the simple model. It should be clear that the equivalence of competitive
equilibria and sophisticated outcomes, as in Lemma 2, holds here.
We now turn to unique implementation of competitive equilibrium by sophisticated
policies.
B. Sophisticated Policies
We now show that any competitive equilibrium can be uniquely implemented with
sophisticated policies. The basic idea behind our construction is that the central bank starts
by picking any competitive equilibrium allocations and sets its policy on the equilibrium
path consistent with this equilibrium. The central bank then constructs its policy o⁄ the
equilibrium path so that any deviations from these allocations would never be a best response
for any individual price setter. In so doing, the constructed sophisticated policies support
the chosen allocations as the unique equilibrium allocations.
To prove our implementation result we need to ￿nd a policy of the central bank such
that if all other producers but one choose a particular deviation, it is optimal for the one
producer to choose a price di⁄erent from the particular deviation. If such policies can be
found we say the best responses are controllable. As we discuss below a su¢ cient condition
for controllability is that the continuation equilibrium is unique.
23With Reversion to a Money Regime
In our construction of sophisticated policies with reversion to a money regime, we ￿nd
it convenient to consider sophisticated policies with in￿nite reversion to money. Under these
policies, along the equilibrium path the central bank chooses the prescribed interest rates i￿
t:
If, instead, sticky price producers deviate by setting ~ xt 6= x￿
t; then the central bank switches
to a money regime with money growth set so that the pro￿t-maximizing value of xt(i) is such
that xt(i) 6= ~ xt:
To illustrate the details of our construction of monetary policy following a deviation,
we suppose that in the nonlinear economy preferences are given by U(c;l) = logc + b(1 ￿ l);
where c is consumption and l is labor supply, so that in the linearized economy Taylor￿ s ￿
equals one. We also suppose that after a deviation the central bank reverts to a constant
money supply m = logM: With a constant money supply, it is convenient to use the original
formulation of the economy in which we use price levels rather than in￿ ation rates. The
cash-in-advance constraint implies that yr +pr = m for all r so that with ￿ = 1, (34) reduces
to







That is, if after a deviation the central bank chooses a constant level of the money supply m
then sticky price producers optimally choose their prices to be m:
We can use (45) to show how a sophisticated policy with in￿nite reversion to money
deters deviations. To do so, consider a history in which price-setters in period t deviate from
p￿
st to ~ pst: Clearly, (45) implies that for any history, the central bank can e⁄ectively control the
best response of any price-setter by the appropriate choice of monetary policy. Speci￿cally,
the central bank can make it optimal for an individual price-setter to choose pst(i) 6= ~ pst:
The following proposition then follows immediately.
Proposition 4. Unique Implementation with Reversion to Money Sup-
pose that ￿ = 1: Then any competitive equilibrium, that is any sequence of in￿ ation and
output that satis￿es the deterministic versions of (1), (2), (40), (42), (43) and (44), can be
implemented as a unique equilibrium with sophisticated policies with an in￿nite reversion to
money.
24The logic of the proof of the proposition again makes clear that in order for reversions
to money to uniquely implement equilibrium outcomes, sophisticated policies must have a
controllability property. Equation (45) makes clear that the best response of each individual
price-setter is controllable.
With Reversion to an Interest Rate Regime
We turn now to constructing our policies in which the central bank chooses interest
rates both on and o⁄ the equilibrium path. We prove a lemma that gives conditions under
which the continuation equilibrium under these policies is unique. We use this construction
and our lemma to prove our main result regarding unique implementation.
Construction of Sophisticated Policies We construct policies to support an arbitrary





t=0. In our construction we need to de￿ne
policies for all histories in which private agents may or may not have deviated. Note that
we do not de￿ne policies for histories in which the central bank alone has deviated. (Doing
so is straightforward but unneccesary because we assume the central bank can commit to its
policies.)
Consider ￿rst histories along the equilibrium path, that is, histories in which there











t=0. For such histories let the central bank chooses the prescribed
interest rates (i￿
t):
Consider next histories in which the ￿rst deviation ~ xs occurs in some period s; that
is, hgs = (h￿
s￿1;xs;￿s) but xs 6= x￿
s: We now construct policies that discourage individual
price setters from joining in this deviation, that is, we construct policies so the optimal price
chosen by an individual price setter xs(i) di⁄ers from ~ xs:
In period s; as in all periods, in￿ ation and the aggregate price setting choice are
mechanically linked by (38). This mechanical link means we can equally well think of the
deviation in terms of in￿ ation or the price setting choice. It is convenient to express the
deviation in terms of in￿ ation. Thus, we let ~ ￿s = (1 ￿ ￿)~ xs denote the in￿ ation associated
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where the setting of the parameter ￿ is described below and ￿ {s is some nonzero number.
Consider next histories hgs in which a deviation has occured in some period t < s: For
such histories let the policy be given by (46).
Note that in our construction the policies chosen in the period with the ￿rst deviation
coincide with policies in periods subsequent to the deviation except when the ￿rst deviation is
to ~ ￿s = 0: The reason is that under the ￿ that we choose for (46) the continuation equilibrium
will imply that ￿s = 0 so that xs(i) = 0: To discourage a deviation to ~ ￿s = 0 we need to
choose a policy that makes xs(i) 6= 0: A policy that sets ￿ {s 6= 0 ensures that xs(i) 6= 0:
Uniqueness of Continuation Equilibrium In order to show the our constructed policies
uniquely implement the desired outcome we show that after a deviation in period s; the best
responses in period s are controllable. To do so we ￿rst show that the continuation equilibrium
from s + 1 onward is unique.
Given our construction in all periods t ￿ s + 1 the central bank is using a Taylor rule
of the form
it = ￿￿t: (47)
We show that the Taylor rule parameter ￿ can be chosen in such a way that the continuation
equilibrium is uniquely given by yt = ￿t = 0 for all t ￿ s + 1:
To verify uniqueness of the continuation equilibrium for an appropriate choice of ￿, we
begin by solving (1), (42), and (47) without imposing the transversality-like condition (40)
(or any boundedness conditions). To do so, we substitute out it in (1), using (47), to get
yt+1 +  ￿t+1 = yt +  ￿￿t; (48)
which together with (42) de￿nes a dynamical system. Letting zt = (yt;￿t)0; with some




























































b )ys+1 + ￿s+1
i
=￿; where ￿ is the deter-
minant of A: Here and throughout we restrict attention to values of ￿ 2 [0;￿max]; where ￿max
is the largest value of ￿ that yields real eigenvalues. (That is, at ￿max the discriminant in
(50) is zero.)
For a continuation outcome to be part of an equilibrium outcome, it must satisfy the
transversality-like condition (40) and the boundedness conditions (43), (44) as well as (49).
The restrictions imposed by the transversality condition (40) on the solutions described in

































)!2s+1 ￿ ￿: (52)
The "initial" conditions !1s+1;!2s+1 satisfying (51) and (52) determine the continuation out-
comes from (49).
We now develop conditions such that there exists a Taylor rule coe¢ cient ￿ under
which the only solution to (49) that satis￿es our transverality and boundedness conditions
has !1s+1 = !2s+1 = 0: It is easy to see from (50) that if ￿ < 1; the smaller eigenvalue ￿1
is less than one while if ￿ > 1 then ￿1 is greater than one. Clearly, then no ￿ < 1 will
guarantee uniqueness because with ￿1 < 1; a continuum of values of !1s+1 satisfying (51)
and (52) exists. Notice also that not all ￿ > 1 will yield uniqueness. For some values of
￿ > 1 there will be a continuum of solutions that have the property the in￿ ation converges
to in￿nity, the level of output is bounded (the log of output converges to negative in￿nity)
and the transversality condition is satis￿ed. Hence, for such values we will have a continuum
27of equilibria. These considerations imply that the Taylor coe¢ cient ￿ we seek must be larger
than one and have the property that under it all solutions to (49) with either !1s+1 6= 0 or
!2s+1 6= 0 violate either our the transversality condition or our boundedness condition and
hence will not be continuation competitive equilibria.
We now develop a lemma which shows that under the condition
￿(1 + ￿ ) > 1 (53)
there is some value of ￿ ￿ greater than one such that after any history, if the central bank
switches to a Taylor rule with ￿ 2 (1; ￿ ￿) the resulting continuation is unique. That is, under
(53), the initial conditions !1s+1;!2s+1 satisfying (51) and (52) are unique, and equal to 0;
for a range of values of the Taylor coe¢ cient ￿ greater than 1:
The idea of the proof is that we eliminate the ￿large root indeterminacy￿associated
with the initial condition !2s+1 using the transversality condition. This condition requires
that prices not diverge to in￿nity faster than (1=￿￿)t in that (￿￿)t￿t must converge to zero.
Given the form of in￿ ation in (49), this condition requires that (￿￿￿2)t!2s+1 converge to zero.
In the appendix we show that under (53), ￿￿￿2 > 1 for ￿ 2 (1; ￿ ￿) so that !2s+1 = 0:
We eliminate the ￿small root indeterminacy￿ associated with the initial condition
!1s+1 using the boundedness condition. To develop this argument suppose that !2s+1 = 0:
The form of output and in￿ ation in (52) implies that if ￿1 > 1 and (￿1 ￿ a)=b > 0; then
both output and in￿ ation converge to in￿nity (when !1s+1 > 0) or both converge to minus
in￿nity (when !1s+1 < 0): In the former case output is unbounded above and in the latter
case in￿ ation is unbounded below. In the appendix we show that if ￿ 2 (1; ￿ ￿); ￿1 > 1 and
(￿1 ￿ a)=b > 0: Hence !1s+1 = 0: We then conclude that for ￿ 2 (1; ￿ ￿); !1s+1 = !2s+1 = 0 so
that yt = ￿t = 0 for t ￿ s + 1:
Consider then the following lemma which is proved in Appendix B.
Lemma 6. Suppose (53) is satis￿ed. Then there exists some value of ￿ ￿ > 1 such that
if the central bank chooses a reversion policy of the Taylor rule form with ￿ 2 (1; ￿ ￿) then the
resulting continuation is unique from s + 1 onwards and the associated output and in￿ ation
rates are zero in all periods t ￿ s + 1 where the deviation occurs in period s:
28We now use Lemma 6 to show that the policies following a deviation, parameterized
by ￿ and ￿ {s; can be chosen so that the best response xs(i) of an individual price-setter is
unique and controllable. Let ￿ be chosen so that ￿ 2 (1; ￿ ￿) and satis￿es ￿ 6= 1=(1 ￿ ￿)￿ :
From (37) and (38), the best response xs(i) given the in￿ ation ~ ￿s induced by the deviation is




Note that xs+1 = 0 because Lemma 6 implies that for all periods after the one with the
deviation, output and in￿ ation are zero; that is, yr = ￿r = xr = 0 for all r ￿ s+1: Next note
that substituting ys+1 = ￿s+1 = 0 into the Euler equation (1) gives that ys = ￿ is: Using
both of these results, we can rewrite (54) as




Using (38) and the form of the sophisticated policy which implies that is = ￿~ ￿s; we can
rewrite (55) as
xs(i) =
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿
~ xs:: (56)
The condition that ￿ 6= 1=(1 ￿ ￿)￿  implies that xs(i) 6= ~ xs unless ~ xs = 0:
If ~ xs = 0; then recall that the policy rule speci￿es that is is some nonzero number, so
that, using (55), xs(i) is not equal to zero. We then have proved the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Unique Implementation with Reversion to Taylor Rules
Suppose (53) is satis￿ed. Then a sophisticated policy indexed by ￿ {s and ￿ with ￿ {s 6= 0 and
￿ 2 (1; ￿ ￿) and satisfying ￿ 6= 1=(1 ￿ ￿)￿  uniquely implements any competitive equilibrium
outcome.
The basic idea of our construction is that by reverting to a Taylor rule with ￿ in the
determinate region, the central bank uniquely pins down the continuation values of output
and in￿ ation from s+1 on. By varying the policy in period s; the central bank can uniquely
control any best response and thereby discourage any deviation. Thus, here, as before,
sophisticated policies can be used to control best responses.
29In our proof we used one particular set of policies o⁄the equilibrium path to discourage
deviations, but many others will also discourage deviations. For example, for histories o⁄the
equilibrium path we could instead have used policies of the form
it = ￿ {t + ￿￿t (57)
where￿ {t is an exogenous bounded deterministic sequence and ￿ 2 (1; ￿ ￿): These policies o⁄the
equilibrium path along with policies that specify it = i￿
t on the equilibrium path with ￿t = ￿￿
t
can uniquely implement outcomes with interest rates i￿
t; in￿ ation ￿￿
t; and the associated
output y￿
t:
If (53) is violated, it can be shown that there is indeterminacy under interest rate
rules for all ￿ 2 [0;￿max]: For such economies, sophisticated policies with specify reversion
to Taylor rules do not uniquely implement outcomes. It may still be possible to uniquely
implement outcomes by specifying reversion to money rules.
The King Rule We now show that the King rule can implement bounded equilibria but
does not implement all equilibria. To that end consider policies of the King rule form
it(hgt) = i
￿
t + ￿(xt ￿ x
￿
t) (58)
where xt is an element of the history hgt = (ht￿1;xt;￿t) where ht￿1 = fxs;￿s;ys;isg
t￿1
s=0:
This rule speci￿es behavior both on and o⁄the equilibrium path. For histories on the
equilibrium path xt = x￿
t so that it(hgt) = i￿
t: For histories o⁄ the equilibrium path this rule
speci￿es it(hgt) = i￿
t whenever xt = x￿
t and (58) for histories with xt 6= x￿
t:
To show that, in our context, the King rule can implement bounded equilibria we
replace the levels of variables in our dynamical system with their deviations from the target
and mimic our proof above.
To see that the King rule cannot necessarily implement unbounded equilibria consider
the following desired outcome
y
￿





















The reason is that ￿1 < 1=￿ so that there is a continuum of values of !10 ￿ 0 which satisfy
tranversality and boundedness. The basic idea is the second term in ￿t goes to minus in￿nity
slower than the ￿rst term goes to plus in￿nity. With !10 ￿ 0; yt goes to minus in￿nity
and ￿t goes to plus in￿nity. Such a path violates neither our boundness conditions nor our
transversality condition.
An interesting feature of this rule is only current deviations a⁄ect the current setting
of policy and past deviations have no e⁄ect on the current setting of policy. In this sense, this
rule forgives past deviations. If there is a deviation in some period s the economy returns
to the original equilibrium path in the period after the deviation. Note that our formulation
gives outcomes following deviations which are quite di⁄erent from those in the literature on
implementation via nonexistence. In our formulation following a deviation, in￿ ation does
not explode but rather returns to the original equilibrium path. Nonetheless, our translation
of the King policy achieves implementation by discouraging deviations from the equilibrium
path. In contrast, in the literature￿ s formulation following a deviation in￿ ation explodes
and no equilibrium exists. Hence, the literature￿ s formulation of the King policy achieves
implementation via nonexistence.
Other Views on Bounds So far we have considered one view on bounds. Since the issue
of what bounds to impose is controversial, we discuss other views brie￿ y. Adding bounds
reduces the region of indeterminacy and expands the region of determinacy. These bounds
increase the applicability of these policies, but reduce their need. As the region of determinacy
expands, the range of parameter values for which sophisticated policies can be used for unique
implementation also expands. As the region of indeterminacy shrinks, however, the range of
parameter values for which sophisticated policies are needed shrinks.
Strict Bound View Consider ￿rst the standard view in the literature, namely, the
strict bound view. In this view, only outcomes that are bounded both above and below are
considered reasonable. Under this view the range of Taylor rules coe¢ cients which yield
uniqueness expands to include all values of ￿ 2 (1;￿max). To see the expansion in the range,
31note from (50) that ￿1 > 1 when ￿ > 1: Since ￿2 ￿ ￿1 > 1 for ￿ > 1; (49) and the boundedness
conditions imply that !1s+1 = !2s+1 = 0: Hence, the continuation equilibrium is unique for
all ￿ > 1: Here, we can choose the Taylor rule parameter in a reversion to any value of ￿ > 1;
hence, the analog of Proposition 5 holds even for parameter values that violate (53). Clearly,
the strict bound view expands the applicability of sophisticated policies by expanding the
range of ￿ such that the equilibrium is determinate relative to our view. It also reduces the
range for which these policies are needed.
No Bound View Another view is that neither transversality nor boundness condi-
tions should be imposed. Under this view reversion to interest rate regimes cannot achieve
implementation but reversion to a money regime can.
C. Welfare and the Taylor Principle
We have shown that adherence to the Taylor principle is not necessary nor su¢ cient for
the unique implementation of a desired equilibrium outcome. Here we ask whether e¢ cient
outcomes satisfy the Taylor principle in the sense that an observer of the e¢ cient outcome
path who regressed interest rates on in￿ ation rates would ￿nd a regression coe¢ cient greater
than one. We show that whether this regression coe¢ cient is larger or smaller than one has
little to do with e¢ ciency.
To make this question interesting we need to add stochastic shocks to the model. We
follow much of the literature in adding a cost-push shock, namely a stochastic shock to the
New Keynesian Phillips curve so that it is of the form
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿yt + ut (59)
where ut is i.i.d., has mean zero, and is the cost-push shock. Following the exposition in















subject to (59) where we have assumed that the economy has no distortions in the steady state.
(The basic idea is the monopoly distortion is o⁄set by a constant subsidy to labor.) Here ￿
32is a parameter that determines the elasticity of substitution 1=(1￿￿) between di⁄erentiated
goods as well as the steady state markup 1=￿:
Following Woodford (2003, p. 489) it is easy to derive the e¢ cient allocations. Given
these allocations a regression of interest rates on in￿ ation has a regression coe¢ cient of
cov(it;￿t)
var(￿t)




where 0 < ￿1 < 1 is the smaller root of the characteristic equation
￿￿
2 ￿ (1 + ￿ + ￿￿)￿ + 1 = 0:
Clearly, as ￿ ranges from 1 to in￿nity the regression coe¢ cient ranges from 0 to in￿nity.
Hence, the magnitude of this coe¢ cient has little to do with e¢ ciency.
3. Trembles and Imperfect Information
Thus far we have shown that any equilibrium outcome can be implemented as a unique
equilibrium with sophisticated policies. In our equilibrium, deviations in private actions lead
to changes in the regime. This observation leads one to ask how sophisticated policies should
be constructed if we allow for trembles in private decisions or if the central bank can monitor
private decisions only imperfectly.
A. Trembles
Consider ￿rst allowing for trembles in private decisions by supposing that the actual
price chosen by a price-setter, xt(i); di⁄ers from the intended price, ^ xt(i); by an additive error
"t(i); so that
xt(i) = ^ xt(i) + "t(i):
If "t(i) is independently distributed across agents, then it simply washes out in the aggregate
and is irrelevant. Even if "t(i) is correlated across agents, say, because it has both an aggregate
and an idiosyncratic component, our argument goes through unchanged if the central bank
can observe the aggregate component, say, with a random sample of prices.
33B. Imperfect Information
More interesting is a situation in which the central bank has imperfect information
about prices. We consider two formulations of imperfect information. In the ￿rst, labeled
imperfect monitoring, the central bank observes the aggregate action of price-setters xt with
probability q and observes nothing with probability 1￿q: In the second, labeled measurement
error, the central bank observes the actions of price setters with symmetric measurement
error. Of course, if the central bank could see some other variable perfectly, such as output
or interest rates on private debt, then it could infer what the private agents did. In this sense,
we think of these setups as ones that gives the central bank minimal amounts of information
relative to what actual central banks have.
We will show that with imperfect monitoring we can exactly implement any desired
outcome while with measurement error we can implement outcomes which are close to the
desired outcomes when the measurement error is small.
Imperfect Monitoring
Consider the imperfect monitoring formulation. We restrict attention to deviations
which generate bounded paths for in￿ ation, with the rationale that the central bank can
easily ￿gure out if the economy is on an unbounded path.
We prove the following proposition in Appendix B:
Proposition 7. Unique Implementation with Imperfect Monitoring. If
the detection probability q is su¢ ciently high, so that
1
1 ￿ q
> 1 + ￿q + (1 ￿ q)￿ ; (62)
then sophisticated policies with in￿nite reversion to money can uniquely implement any
competitive equilibrium outcome. Under condition (53) and (62), sophisticated policies with
reversion to interest rates can uniquely implement any equilibrium outcome
The sophisticated policies we use to prove this result are as follows. If the central
bank detects a deviation, then it switches to a suitably chosen policy that yields uniqueness.
Such a policy could be either a reversion to a money regime or a reversion to an interest
rate regime in the determinate region. With such policies in place, it is easy to work out the
34dynamical system following undetected deviations. If the detection probability satis￿es (62),
then the dynamical system has a unique solution, so that the best response is controllable.
Notice that for any values of the other parameters, there is always a detection proba-
bility strictly less than one that satis￿es (62).
Suppose next that the central bank perfectly monitors prices every K periods. An
argument similar to that in Proposition 7 can then be used to obtain unique implementation.
The essential idea behind both this result and that in Proposition 7 is that indeterminacy
arises in the New Keynesian model because the associated dynamical system lacks a terminal
condition. Periodic monitoring provides the needed terminal condition and probabilistic
monitoring acts a form of discounting that e⁄ectively provides a terminal condition.
Measurement Error
Next we turn to the measurement error formulation. In this formulation the central
bank observes
~ xt = xt + "t (63)
where "t is i.i.d. over time and has mean zero and variance ￿2
": Consider supporting some
desired bounded outcome path. We consider monetary policies of the King rule form (58).
We have already shown that the King Rule uniquely implements bounded equilibria when
the economy has no measurement error. Here the King rule can be written as
it(hgt) = i
￿




t + ￿(xt ￿ x
￿
t) + ￿"t (64)
It is easy to show that in this economy with measurement error the best response of any
indidvual price setter is identical to that in the economy without measurement error. The
reason is that the best response depends only the expected values of future variables. Given
that the measurement error "t has mean zero these expected values are unchanged. It follows
that the unique equilibrium in this economy with measurement error has xt = x￿
t: The realized
value of output yt, however, ￿ uctuates around the target value y￿
t. From the Euler equation
the realized value of output is given by yt = y￿
t ￿ ￿"t. Clearly, as the size of the measurement
error "t goes to zero, the outcomes converge to the desired outcomes. We have established
the following proposition.
35Proposition 8. Approximate Implementation with Measurement Error.
As the variance of the measurement error approaches zero, sophisticated policies of the King
rule form yield outcomes with converge to the desired outcomes.
4. Concluding Remarks
We have de￿ned and illustrated what we have called sophisticated policies for monetary
economies and have shown how they can uniquely implement any competitive outcome. The
logic of our arguments should extend to other applications, including analyses of ￿nancial
crises, ￿scal policy and so on.
The main message of this paper is that in designing policy we should follow the Ram-
sey approach to determine the best competitive equilibrium, and then check whether best
responses are controllable. If they are, then sophisticated policies of the kind we have con-
structed can uniquely implement the Ramsey outcome. If they are not, then policymakers
have no choice but to accept indeterminacy. We have shown that this way of thinking about
implementation makes the Taylor principle irrelevant.
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39Notes
1An extensive literature has used the Ramsey approach to discuss optimal monetary
policy. See, among others, Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1996), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2004),Siu (2004), and Corrreia, Nicolini, and Teles (2008).
2We choose this part of the policy in order to make it abundantly clear that after a
deviation the central bank is not doing anything exotic, such as producing a hyperin￿ ation.
Rather, in an intuitive sense, the central bank is simply getting the economy back on the
track it had been on before the deviation threatenned to shift it in another direction.
405. Appendix A: The Nonlinear Economies
Here we describe the nonlinear economies that when linearized give the equilibrium
conditions described in the body of this work.
A. The Simple Sticky Price Model
This model is a monetary economy populated by a large number of identical, in￿nitely
lived consumers, ￿ exible price and sticky price intermediate good producers, ￿nal good pro-
ducers, and a government. In each period t, the economy experiences one of ￿nitely many
events st: We denote by st = (s0;:::;st) the history of events up through and including pe-
riod t. The probability, as of period zero, of any particular history st is g(st). The initial
realization s0 is given.
The timing within a period is as follows. At the beginning of the period, sticky price
producers set their prices and the govenment chooses its monetary policy, either by setting
interest rates or by choosing the quantity of money. The event st is then realized. At the end
of the period, ￿ exible price producers set their prices, and consumers and ￿nal good producers
make their decisions. The event st is associated with a ￿ight to quality shock (1 ￿ ￿(st)) that
a⁄ects the attractiveness of government debt relative to private claims.
In each period t; the commodities in this economy are labor, a consumption good,
money, and a continuum of intermediate goods indexed by i 2 [0;1]. The technology for










where y(st) is the ￿nal good and y(i;st) is an intermediate good of type i. The technology




where l(i;st) is the input of labor.
Intermediate good producers behave as imperfect competitors. Fraction ￿ of interme-
diate good producers have ￿ exible prices in that they set their prices in period t after the
realization of the shock st. Fraction 1 ￿ ￿ have sticky prices, in that they set their prices in
period t before the realization of the shock st: Let Pf(i;st) denote the price set by a ￿ exible
41price producer i 2 [0;￿]; and let Ps(i;st) denote the price set by a sticky price producer
i 2 [￿;1]:
Final good producers behave competitively. In each period t; they choose inputs














subject to (65), where P(st) is the price of the ￿nal good in period t. Solving the problem in






























Using (66), we can see that the problem faced by the ￿ exible price producers is to choose









subject to (68), where W(st) is the nominal wage rate. The resulting optimal price is given





















subject to (68), where Q(stjst￿1) is the price of a dollar at st in units of a dollar at st￿1. The














We turn now to the consumers. The consumer side of the economy is a variant of the
standard cash-in-advance formulation, as in Lucas (1992), with two modi￿cations. First, we
42assume that the government pays interest on wages at the private market interest rate. This
modi￿cation ensures that the consumer￿ s ￿rst-order condition for labor supply is undistorted
as in the cashless economies of Woodford (2003). Second, we allow for ￿ ight to quality shocks
that a⁄ect government debt relative to private debt.










where c(st) and l(st) are consumption and labor. In each period t = 0;1;:::, consumers face
a cash-in-advance constraint in which purchases of consumption goods are constrained by






















where B(st) is government debt with price 1=R(st);Rp(st) is the rate of return on private
debt, ￿(st) is the nominal pro￿ts of the intermediate good producers, ￿l is a subsidy to labor
income and T(st) is nominal transfers and where the right side of (76) is given in period 0:
The subsidy ￿l is set, as is standard in the literature, to undo the ine¢ ciency in a steady
state due to monopoly power Speci￿cally, (1 + ￿l) = 1=￿: Note that we have imposed that
the cash-in-advance constraint holds with equality.
The consumer￿ s problem is to maximize utility, subject to the cash-in-advance con-
straint, the budget constraint, and borrowing constraints, B(st+1) ￿ ￿ B; for some large nega-
tive number ￿ B: For notational simplicity, we have suppressed decisions on holdings of private
state-contingent debt with price Q(stjst￿1) and private state-uncontingent debt with the pri-







































If we log-linearize this economy, then we can obtain the equations in the body for the
simple model. Setting (1 + ￿l) = 1=￿;we obtain the quadratic approximation to welfare used
in the text.
B. The Model with Staggered Price-Setting
This model is nearly identical to the simple model above. The main di⁄erences are
that in this new model there are no ￿ exible price producers and each producer can reset
prices in each period with probability 1 ￿ ￿:





















































The consumer side of the model is identical to that in the simple model. This staggered
price-setting model when linearized gives the equilibrium conditions described in the body.
6. Appendix B: Proofs of Lemma 6 and Propositions 6 and 7
Here we prove Lemma 6 and Propositions 6 and 7. We will use the following to help
prove Lemma 6 and the propositions. Let ￿1(￿) and ￿2(￿) be de￿ned from (50).
Lemma A. The smaller eigenvalue ￿1(￿) is increasing in ￿ and the larger eigenvalue
￿2(￿) is decreasing in ￿: Furthermore, for all ￿ 2 [1;1=￿)the smaller eigenvalue satis￿es
￿1(￿) > 1 and ￿1(￿) ￿ a)=b > 0.:
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: (78)
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￿
: (79)
Clearly, ￿1 is an increasing function of ￿ and ￿2 is a decreasing function of ￿:






















































































so that ￿1(￿) > 1 for all ￿ 2 (1;1=￿):














￿ < 0 for ￿ = 1
1
￿ ￿ (1 +
￿ 






Since a = 1+￿ =￿ and b = ￿￿1=￿; we have shown that (￿1(￿)￿a)=b > 0 for all ￿ 2 [1;1=￿):
Q:E:D:
A. Lemma 6
Recall that Lemma 6 is the following.
Lemma 6. Suppose (53) is satis￿ed. Then there exists some value of ￿ ￿ > 1 such that
if the central bank chooses a reversion policy of the Taylor rule form with ￿ 2 (1; ￿ ￿) then the
resulting continuation is unique and the associated output and in￿ ation rates are zero in all
periods t ￿ s + 1 where the deviation occurs in period s:
Proof of Lemma 6. We now develop su¢ cient conditions under which the initial
conditions !1s+1;!2s+1 satisfying (51) and (52) are unique, and equal to 0; for a range of
values of the Taylor coe¢ cient ￿ greater than 1:
45We eliminate the large root indeterminacy by ￿nding values for the Taylor rule para-
meter ￿ so that the transversality condition rules out paths for in￿ ation that explode at rate




￿) = 1 (80)
if ￿￿￿2(￿max) ￿ 1; and by ￿max if there is no value of ￿ 2 [0;￿max] for which ￿￿￿2(￿) = 1:
We now show that under (53), ￿
￿ > 1: To see this note from (79) that ￿2(1) = (1 + ￿ )=￿
so that ￿￿￿2(1) = ￿(1 + ￿ ) which by (53) is greater than one. Since ￿2(￿) is decreasing
it follows that if ￿￿￿2(￿
￿) = 1 is satis￿ed for some point ￿
￿ in [1;￿max] then ￿
￿ > 1: If no
such point exists then ￿
￿ = ￿max which is also greater than 1. Either way ￿
￿ > 1: Hence,
￿￿￿2(￿) > 1 for all ￿ 2 [0;￿
￿) and the transversality condition, written as (51), is satis￿ed
only if !2s+1 = 0 for all ￿ 2 [0;￿
￿):
We eliminate small root indeterminacy by ￿nding values for the Taylor rule parameter
such that the smaller root ￿1(￿) is larger than one and the coe¢ cient on the initial condition
on the small root !1s+1; namely (￿1(￿)￿a)=b > 0: For such values of ￿ the bound on output
in (52) requires that !1s+1 ￿ 0 and the bound on in￿ ation in (52) requires that !1s+1 ￿ 0
so that !1s+1 = 0: From Lemma A we have that the required interval is [1;1=￿) because for
all ￿ 2 [1;1=￿) we have that ￿1(￿) > 1 and (￿1(￿) ￿ a)=b > 0.
Combining the two parts of the argument we have that if ￿ satis￿es both ￿ 2 [0;￿
￿) and
￿ 2 [1;1=￿) then both large root indeterminacy and small root indeterminacy are eliminated.
The intersection of these intervals is contained in (1; ￿ ￿) where






￿ > 1 and 1=￿ > 1; clearly ￿ ￿ > 1: In sum, we have shown that that there exists a ￿ ￿ > 1
such that for ￿ 2 (1; ￿ ￿) the initial conditions for the dynamical system !2s+1 = !1s+1 = 0
that starts after the deviation. Hence from (49) we have that yt = ￿t = 0 for all t ￿ s + 1.
Q:E:D:
B. Proposition 6
Recall that Proposition 6 is the following:
46Proposition 6. Rules Satisfying the Taylor Principle are Inefficient
The outcomes under a Taylor rule of the form (29) with ￿ > 1 are dominated by outcomes
of an equilibrium with ￿ = 0.
We begin by working out the stochastic processes for yt and ￿t implied by the dynam-
ical system. For notational simplicity we write ￿2t as simply ￿t: We begin with the dynamical
system that arises with ￿ = 0: We can write this system as
yt = Etyt+1 +  ￿t+1 + ￿t (81)
￿t+1 = ￿Et￿t+2 + ￿Etyt+1: (82)
We solve this system using the method exposited by Lubik and Schorfeide (2003). In solving
this system, it is convenient to let ut = ￿t+1 and to let the forecast errors be de￿ned by
"yt ￿ yt￿Et￿1yt and "ut ￿ ut￿Et￿1ut: After some manipulation, we can write (81) and (82)
as
Etzt+1 = ￿Et￿1zt + ￿￿t + ￿"t; (83)

































Let J ^ J￿1 = ￿ be the Jordan decomposition of ￿: Letting wt = J￿1Etzt+1; we can write
this system as
wt = ^wt￿1 + J
￿1￿￿t + J
￿1￿"t;

































47It is immediate that since ￿  > 0, 0 ￿ ￿1 < 1 < ￿2; so that there exists a continuum of
solutions. More precisely, since the number of explosive roots, here 1, is less than the number
of expectation errors, here 2; the system has one degree of indeterminacy.
The best outcome clearly has bounded output and in￿ ation, so that we need to choose
both the initial condition on !20 and the shocks so as to never put weight on the explosive
root. These restrictions can be summarized by a condition on the deterministic component
of the system
[J
￿1Etzt+1]2￿ = 0 (85)
and a condition on the stochastic component
[J
￿1￿]2￿￿t + [J
￿1￿]2￿ "t = 0: (86)













(￿t ￿ "yt) +
 
1 ￿ ￿1 +
1
￿
(￿  + 1)
!
"ut = 0: (88)
For later use, let D be de￿ned from (88) so that
"ut = D(￿t ￿ "yt): (89)
Since we have chosen w2t to be identically zero, we can write the solution to the system as


























Using (87) in (90), we have, after some manipulation, that































￿2 ￿ 1 ￿



















(￿t ￿ "yt) +
 
￿2 ￿ 1 ￿





Using (89), we can write this latter equation as















￿2 ￿ a ￿
1
￿




and "yt is a free random variable which captures the stochastic indeterminacy of the system.
The solution for yt+1 is, then,
yt+1 = Etyt+1 + "yt+1;




Etyt+1 + D(￿t+1 ￿ "yt+1): (92)
Consider now the proof of Proposition 6.













and the system described above. To do so, we assume that y0 is drawn from the invariant







var("t ￿ ￿yt): (94)
49>From the de￿nition of the forecast error ￿yt+1; we have that
var(yt+1) = varEtyt+1 + var("yt+1) (95)







2var(￿t+1 ￿ "yt+1): (96)















A + ￿var("yt+1) (97)






























6= 1; it is clear
that A = 1 is not optimal. Q:E:D:
C. Proposition 7
Recall that Proposition 7 is the following:




> 1 + ￿q + (1 ￿ q)￿ ; (98)
then sophisticated policies can uniquely implement any competitive equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the sophisticated policies of the form used in the proof of Proposition
5 except that the reversion phase is triggered only if a deviation is detected. By construction
there is a unique equilibrium continuation following a detection.
We now show that when there is no detection there is also a unique equilibrium. Con-
sider then the dynamical system when a deviation occurs but is not detected. For notational
simplicity, imagine that the deviation occurs in period 0. In period t; the deviation at zero is
50detected with probability q: Let ym
t and ￿m
t+1 denote output and in￿ ation under the reversion
policy when the period 0 deviation is ￿rst detected in period t: Choose the reversion polcy
so that ym
t = ￿m
t+1 = 0 for all t ￿ 1: The resulting system is, then,
yt = (1 ￿ q)(yt+1 +  ￿t+1) (99)
￿t = (1 ￿ q)(￿￿t+1 + ￿yt): (100)
A sequence of output and in￿ ation is part of a continuation equilibrium if and only if it
satis￿es (99), (100), (40), (43) and (44). Letting zt = (yt;￿t)0; with some manipulation we




































for t ￿ 1:
































With some algebra, it can be shown that condition (98), implies that ￿2 ￿ ￿1 > 1 so that the
paths of output and in￿ ation given by (101) do not have bounded indeterminacy. Thus, the
only possible solutions are yt = ￿t = 0 or paths in which output or in￿ ation are unbounded.
We rule out large root indeterminacy by using the transversality condition. In particular,
straightforward algebra shows that if (53) is satis￿ed, ￿￿￿2 > 1 so that the transversality
condition implies that the system does not have large root indeterminacy, that is that !0
2 = 0
. To rule out small root indeterminacy we show that the only unbounded sequences satisfying
(99) and (100) have either output going to plus in￿nity or in￿ ation to minus in￿nity, so that
they violate the boundedness conditions. In particular, with some algebra we can show that
(￿1 ￿ a0)=b0 > 0 so that from (101), it follows that, if !0
1 > 0; yt converges to plus in￿nity
and if !0
1 < 0; ￿t converges to minus in￿nity. Thus, !0
1 = !0
2 = 0; so that (101) implies that
51yt = ￿t = 0 for all t ￿ 1: An argument identical to that in the proof of Proposition 5 shows
that reversion policies can be designed in period 0 to make best responses controllable, so
that the sophisticated policies uniquely implement any competitive equilibrium. Q:E:D:
52